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Mark A. Dalton, the Appellee, pursuant to Rule 35 of 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, respectfully submits this 
Petition for Rehearing to the Utah Court of Appeals. The four 
points of law or fact which the Court overlooked or misapplied 
follow: 
POINT I 
frHE COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW, ON AN APPEAL OF AN 
ADDITUR, THE APPELLATE COURT DOES NOT 
"VIEW THE EVIDENCE AND ALL REASONABLE 
INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT." 
A REVIEWING COURT ONLY REVERSES THE 
LOWER COURT'S ADDITUR DECISION IF THERE 
IS NO REASONABLE BASIS FOR THE DECISION. 
The first paragraph of the Utah Court of Appeals' 
Memorandum Decision1 begins: 
We note at the offset that a court 
must view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. 
Pratt v. Products. Inc., 885 P.2d 
786, 787 (Utah 1994). 
Pratt was a garden variety appeal of a jury verdict and sets forth 
the correct standard of review for an appeal of a jury verdict. 
"On appeal from a jury's verdict, the court views the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to a jury's verdict." Pratt, supra at 787. However, 
this case is not an appeal of a jury verdict. It is an appeal of 
A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached as Exhibit A. 
1 
District Judge Lewis's decision to award an additur. The standard 
for reviewing Judge Lewis's ultimate decision is set forth in 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 
1991): 
In reviewing the judge's ultimate 
decision . . . we will reverse only if 
there is no reasonable basis for the 
decision. 
A threshold purpose of the Crookston decision, was to clear up the 
confusion about the standard of review applied by trial courts on 
motions challenging a jury's verdict and the different standard of 
review applied by appellate courts of the lower court's ultimate 
decision. Crookston at 802. This Court incorrectly applied the 
standard of review which a lower court applies to the initial 
motion challenging the verdict. In short, this Court mistakenly 
reviewed the verdict directly without considering the intermediate 
action [additur decision] by the trial court. See Andreason v. 
Aetna Casualty Co., 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah App. 1993). Had the 
court applied the correct standard of view, it would have reached 
a different conclusion. As set forth in Point II of this Petition, 
there is plenty of reasonable basis for the additur decision2. 
2The factual support for Judge Lewis's additur decision is also 
summarized in pp. 16-19 of Dalton's Brief of Appellee. 
2 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE 
DAMAGES WERE >vSO INADEQUATE AS TO 
INDICATE A DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE BY 
THE JURY." 
A. Introduction, 
After misstating the standard of view, the Court of 
Appeals subsequently implied that the lower court "did not find 
that the damages were so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of 
the evidence by the jury." However, the lower court did find that 
damages were so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the 
evidence by the jury and there is considerable record support for 
the District Court's decision. 
B. District Judge Lewis correctly found that the damages awarded 
were "so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the evidence 
by the jury." 
Judge Lewis in her Memorandum Decision said: 
[I]f an award shows that the jury 
misapplied or failed to take into 
account proven facts, or misunderstood 
or disregarded the law, or made findings 
clearly against the evidence and the 
verdict is outside the limits of any 
reasonable appraisal of damages as shown 
by the evidence, it should not be 
permitted to stand. 
* * * 
In such instances, the remedy is to 
order a modification of the verdict to 
bring it within the evidence. 
* * * 
3 
The Court finds the amount of $20,007.00 
for future medical expenses to have been 
undisputed and uncontroverted at trial. 
* * * 
This Court finds that the award of 
$3,000.00 does not bear [a] reasonable 
relationship to the evidence adduced at 
trial . . . . An additur is therefore 
granted. (Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-
3.) A copy of the Memorandum is 
attached as Exhibit B. 
The foregoing shows that Judge Lewis, contrary to the opinion of 
this Court, did find that the damages were so inadequate as to 
evidence a disregard of the evidence by the jury. 
C. The record support. 
Only three witnesses, other than Dalton, testified on 
the subject of Daltonfs future medical expenses. Dr. Richard 
Hodnett, a plastic surgeon, testified: 
His [Dalton1 s] CT scan showed that there 
was a chip of bone from the bottom of 
the eye socket down the . . . sinus. 
And if he had the numbness when I saw 
him, and looking at the CT scan, . . . 
he may still have need of what is called 
plate and screw fixation, or another 
open procedure to possibly remove a bone 
chip from around his nerve which was the 
nerve that controls the sensation to his 
lip. 
(R. 770, Ins, 24-25; 771, Ins. 1-8). 
* * * 
The doctor's fees would probably be in 
the range of $2,500 - $3,500 . . . and 
. . . probably in the range of $5,000 -
$8,000 in hospital fees, I would assume. 
4 
(R. 771, Ins. 23-25; 772, Ins. 1, 7, 9-10). 
Dr. Hodnett also testified that Dalton would require 
an osteotomy3 and that the cost would be $15,000 (R. 783-784). 
Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell, a specialist in maxillofacial 
surgery, also testified: 
I think that at some time, he [Dalton] 
will have to have surgery . . . . 
(R. 840, Ins. 17-18). 
The surgery recommended by Mikesell was an 
arthroplasty. Mikesell estimated the cost at $2,500 - $3,000 and 
$8,000 for the hospital fees (R. 836-837). He also testified that 
Dalton needs a bridge that could cost somewhere between $1,200 -
$1,300 (R. 859, 860, In. 3). 
Herold called Dr. Stadler, a specialist in physical 
rehabilitation, as a witness. He is not a surgeon. Further, 
Stadler did not controvert the cost of the future surgery. That 
issue was undisputed. While it is true that Stadler opined that 
Dalton would not benefit from future surgery, the only injury 
Stadler was concerned with was facial nerve damage (R. 874, 876). 
He did not address the injuries testified to by Hodnett and 
Mikesell. Hence, he did not directly contradict Dalton!s need for 
surgery, nor its cost. Further, (1) Stadler was not a surgeon, so 
his testimony warranted very little weight; and (2) his opinion was 
3An osteotomy is the rebreaking of the jaw bones and putting 
them in the proper place (R. 784, Ins. 1-7). 
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based only upon feeling Dalton's face with his hands. Therefore, 
the trial court properly discounted Stadler's opinion and believed 
the testimony of the surgeons who were qualified on the subjects of 
the need and cost for future surgery. In doing so, the trial court 
acted well within its discretion. The trial court, in granting an 
additur, does not determine whether there is any evidence at all 
supporting the verdict but whether the verdict is within or outside 
the limits of a reasonable appraisal of damages. Bodon v. 
Suhrmdan, 8 U.2d 42, 47, 372 P.2d 826 (1958); c.f. King v. Union 
Pac. R. Co., 212 P. 2d 692, 695 (Utah 1949) (where there is a 
substantial conflict of evidence on a material issue, the Supreme 
Court will defer to the discretion exercised by the trial court in 
granting a new trial); see Carlson v. BMW Industries, Inc., 744 
P.2d 1383, 1390 (Wyo. 1987) (the trial court's grant or denial of 
an additur will not be set aside on appeal, unless the court acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously); Creamer v. Troiano, 494 P.2d 738, 740 
(Ariz. App. 1972) (we do not believe that here, where there is a 
conflict in the evidence as to damages, that the trial court should 
be reversed when it determines that the additur was required); 
Jacobson v. Manfredi, 679 P.2d 251, 255 (Nev. 1984) (reviewing 
Court must accord deference to the point of view of the trial 
judge, since he had the opportunity to weigh the evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses). 
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POINT III 
DALTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
IS NOT MERITLESS. THE JUDGMENT AND 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AWARDING A NEW TRIAL 
UNLESS THE APPELLANT CONSENTED TO THE 
ADDITUR, WAS NOT AND IS NOT A FINAL 
APPEALABLE JUDGMENT. 
Dalton, in his Motion for Summary Disposition, said 
that the court's decision to award a new trial if the appellant 
declined to accept the additur, is not a final appealable order. 
A portion of the Memorandum Decision and subsequent judgment 
follow: 
The defendant may accept this ruling or 
request a new trial. (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 6.) 
* * * 
The court having inquired of the jury as 
to its verdict directs that judgment be 
entered in accordance with . . . its 
Memorandum Decision entered September 
22, 1993 and incorporated herein by 
reference (Judgment, p. 2. A copy of 
the Judgment is attached as Exhibit C). 
In Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 U.2d 185, 186 (Utah 1964), the Utah 
Supreme Court explained that an order comparable to the one at 
issue is not a final appealable order: 
The right of appeal is from a final 
judgment. Utah Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 
9, . . . [Rule 4 U.R.A.P.]. The order 
granting a new trial is not a final 
judgment . . . the proper redress is 
either a petition for an interlocutory 
appeal which may be granted in a proper 
case; or the claimed error can be 
preserved and reviewed if necessary upon 
the final outcome of the case . . . . 
C.f. Howell v. Marmpeaaso Compania Naviera S.A., 566 F.2d 992, 993 
(5th Cir. 1978) ; Mauriello v. University of Medicine & Dentistry, 
781 F.2d 46, 49 (3d. Cir. 1986). (When the district court issues 
a remitter order declaring a new trial unless the plaintiff concurs 
to a lesser recovery, the order is not final or appealable until 
the plaintiff accepts the remitter.) 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING ORAL 
ARGUMENT ON THIS APPEAL. 
Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that oral argument is required unless the appellate court 
appropriately concludes that: 
(1) The appeal is frivolous; or (2) the 
disputed issue or set of issues, has 
been recently authoritatively decided; 
or (3) . . . the decisional process 
would not be significantly aided by oral 
argument. 
In this case, the appeal is not frivolous. This Court 
mistakenly awarded the relief sought on appeal. The dispositive 
issues, of what standard of review is applied to the ultimate 
decision granting an additur, has not been authoritatively decided. 
Neither has the issue of whether an order granting a new trial 
unless an additur is accepted, is a final appealable judgment. 
Oral argument was and still is crucial for an 
appropriate review and consideration of the issues presented in 
this case. An oral presentation explaining the correct standard of 
review and showing that the lower court's order was not a final 
8 
appealable judgment, would have prevented this Court from picking 
the wrong standard of review and reviewing an order that is not 
final or appealable. In short, deciding this case, without oral 
argument was plainly and simply contrary to Rule 29. The remedy is 
to grant a rehearing and oral argument. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court, applied the wrong standard of review to 
the lower court's additur decision. Moreover, the Court mistakenly 
overlooked the fact that the lower court's judgment was not final. 
In addition, this Court failed to comply with Rule 29 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Each of the foregoing demands a 
rehearing on the issues raised in this Petition. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Marvin A. Dalton, Jr., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
FILED 
JUL 2 7 1995 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Brian G. Herold, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No, 940170-CA 
F I L E D 
(Ju ly 27 , 1995) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Attorneys; Mark Dalton Dunn and Kevin D. Swenson, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
George T. Waddoups, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Garff1, and Wilkins. 
GARFF, Judge: 
We note at the outset that a court must "view the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to [the jury's] verdict." Pratt v. Prodata, Inc.. 885 
P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1994). 
Herold argues that the trial court erred in granting the 
motion for additur. We agree. 
Before a trial court can enrertain a motion for additur, the 
court must find that the damages awarded were "so inadequate as 
to indicate a disregard of the evidence by the jury." Dupuis v. 
Nielson, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981). Only if the trial court 
so finds can it then consider the motion to determine if "the 
influence of passion or prejudice resulted in inadequate 
damages." Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff, acting pursuant to appointment 
under Utah Code Judicial Administration R3-108(4). 
In this case, the trial court gave the jury Instruction 
Number 44 which states: 
You may award special damages, if proven, for 
the reasonable value of medical care, 
services and supplies reasonably required and 
actually given in the treatment of the 
plaintiff and the reasonable value of similar 
items that more probably than not will be 
required and given in the future. 
(Emphasis added). 
Our review of the record reveals conflicting medical 
evidence on the necessity of future medical care for Dalton's 
injuries, and "the evidence does not compel a finding that 
reasonable persons would have reached a different measure of 
damages." Dupuis, 624 P.2d at 686. The jury, following 
instruction number 44, could reasonably have believed that it was 
"more probable than not" that Dalton would not require and be 
"given [medical care] in the future." Based on the forgoing, the 
trial court should never have considered the motion for additur 
since the record does not show that the jury disregarded the 
evidence. We therefore reverse the trial court's additur and 
reinstate the original jury award of special damages in the 
amount of $3,000.00. 
Because we have reversed the trial court's additur, the 
amount of the final judgment falls below Herold's $15,000.00 
offer o£-^srblement. Therefore, we also reverse the trial 
court's award/ of costs tcv^lton.2 
esiding Judge 
N 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
2. We find the points raised in Dalton's motion for summary 
disposition to be meritless and therefore do not address them. 
See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989). 
2 
Exhibit B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IK AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN A- DALTON# JR. # : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 920903329 
vs. : 
BRIAN G. HEROLD, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Additur or New Trial. A hearing was held in this Court 
on August 10, 1993, and argument was heard on the plaintiff's 
motion. The court denied the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and 
took the Motion for Additur under advisement. The Court having now 
carefully reviewed the relevant law, the memoranda submitted by 
counsel, and having considered counsels'' arguments, rules as stated 
herein. The Court finds that the amount of the jury's verdict is 
inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial, and grants the 
Motion for Additur in the amount of $19,910.24 as to special 
damages. The jury's award of $5,000.00 for general damages is to 
remain at that amount. 
The Court in assessing the verdict has considered the same in 
the light most favorable to the jury's findings. Assessment, under 
FILE COPY 
DALTON V, HEROLD PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
this standard, leads the Court to conclude that the jury's award is 
clearly inadequate in light of the evidence presented at trial. 
The law is clear that although a trial judge may assess the 
evidence differently than a jury, mere disagreement is not a 
sufficient reason to order a new trial or an additur. The power of 
a trial judge to order a new trial or grant an additur is reserved 
for those rare cases when a jury verdict is manifestly contrary to 
the weight of the evidence. Goddard v. Hickman. 685 P. 2d 53 0 (Utah 
1984), and Bodon v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 1958). Bodon v. 
Suhrmann, makes it clear that if an award shows that the jury 
misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts, or 
misunderstood or disregarded the law, or made findings clearly 
against the evidence, and the verdict is outside the limits of any 
reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence, it should 
not be permitted to stand. Although Bodon is a 1958 case, it 
remains the law in Utah. Bodon has been cited and reaffirmed in 
Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981), and in Mever v. 
Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984). 
The Bodon case is important to review in relation to the 
instant case. In Bodon, the contention was that the verdict was 
outside the limits of what appeared justifiable under the evidence. 
The Court ruled, "In such instances the remedy is to order a 
DALTON V. HEROLD PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
modification of the verdict to bring it within the evidence." Id 
at 828. 
This Court finds the amount of $20,007.00 for future medical 
expenses to have been undisputed and uncontroverted at trial. 
During the trial Dr. Richard Hodnett and Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell, 
expert witnesses called by the plaintiff, testified that the amount 
of future medical expenses, if surgery occurred (and they both 
perceived surgery as necessary), would be, at least, $20,007.00. 
Although the defendant called Dr. Warren Stadler as a witness, 
evidence of the cost of the plaintiff's special damages was not 
disputed. 
A finding of negligence was made and a review of the Special 
Verdict form establishes that the jury concluded that the plaintiff 
had been damaged. The award for special damages must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the evidence. This Court finds that the 
award of $3,000.00 does not bear this reasonable relationship to 
the evidence adduced at trial. The plaintiff presented evidence 
that his past medical bills were $2,903.24 (see Exhibit 3); and an 
award of $3,000.00, while close to this amount, is greater than the 
actual past medical expenses, and not consistent with any actual 
special damages. An additur is therefore granted. The total 
special damages testified to were $22,910.24. The jury's award of 
DALTON V. HEROLD PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
$3,000.00, is $19,910.24 below this. Additur is therefore granted 
in the amount of $19,910.24. This amount, when added to the 
special damage verdict of $3,000.00, equals $22,910.24, which is 
consistent with the testimony concerning specials. 
The Court now turns its attention to the general damage award. 
It is well-settled that general damages must bear a reasonable 
relationship to special damages and to the evidence. General 
damages are designed to compensate an injured plaintiff for pain 
and suffering and for damages that the plaintiff has incurred over 
and above those quantifiable damages such as lest wages and medical 
expenses. Mclntire v. Gray, 593 P.2d 1273 (Or. App. 1979). It is 
clear that special damages are more capable of definitive 
assessment than general damages. General damages are by their 
nature more subjective and difficult to pin down. This Court must 
view the general damage award in relation to the original special 
damage award and determine whether a reasonable relationship exists 
between the two. Where the original award for specials was 
$3,000.00 and the general award was $5,000.00; one cannot conclude 
that a reasonable relationship between the two does not exist. The 
question of whether the award bears a reasonable relationship to 
the evidence, must be assessed, with the case law in mind 
concerning general damages. Case law concerning general damages 
indicates that these awards are rarely susceptible of additur. 
DALTON V. HEROLD PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
In Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983), the Court ruled 
that juries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment 
of damages, and that where personal injuries involve a loss of 
employment, personal inconvenience, and pain and suffering, there 
is no set formula to compute the amount of general damages. Id. at 
726. In the case of Sheraden v. Black, 752 P.2d 791, (N.M. App. 
1988) , the Court ruled that "there is no standard fixed by law for 
measuring the value of pain and suffering; rather the amount to be 
awarded is left to the fact finder's judgment." And, in another 
case, Cartwriaht v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc.. 593 P.2d 104 
(Okl. App. 1988) it was held that compensation for pain and 
suffering rests in the sound discretion of the jury, since there is 
no market where pain and suffering are bought and sold, nor any 
standard by which compensation can be definitely ascertained, or 
the amount actually suffered determined. 
This analysis leads this Court to conclude that generals and 
specials are sufficiently distinct from each other that specials 
may be subject to additur without modification of generals. The 
two are not synonymous nor are they inseparable. To illustrate 
this concept, the Court notes that a jury is at liberty, in some 
circumstances, to award one without the other. "When the issue of 
general damages is contested, the jury may conclude that the 
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plaintiff did not actually suffer any general damages but did 
reasonably incur special damages for medical expenses or loss of 
wages. This is the case if the plaintiff's complaints are 
subjective and his credibility is questioned." Eisele v. Rood, 551 
P.2d 441 (Or. 1976). 
While this Court was not privy to the jury's deliberations or 
exact considerations in arriving at the general damage award, this 
Court can only conclude that the jury did not feel that the 
plaintiff's entitlement to general damages, i.e., his pain and 
suffering, warranted a large amount. This Court appreciates the 
province of the jury and will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the jury in arriving at a general damage award. 
In making this ruling,, this Court elects to exercise its 
supervisory power to ensure justice consistent with the jury's 
verdict. 
The defendant may accept this ruling, or request a new trial. 
Dated this ]yucs&ay of September^ 1993. 
5LIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR., 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
BRIAN G. HEROLD, ] 
Defendant. ] 
i JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 920903329PI 
) Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
This matter was tried to the jury on May 17th, 18th, and 
19th, 1993, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding. George T. 
Waddoups and Karen Thomas represented the plaintiff. Mark Dunn and 
Kevin Swenson represented the defendant. 
The Court directed a verdict against the defendant and 
answered question one on the verdict form. The jury found that the 
defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries. The jury also found the plaintiff was negligent and the 
plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries. The jury answered question five by assessing 80% of the 
w*%* 
negligence to the defendant Brian Herold and 20% of the negligence 
to the plaintiff, Art Dalton. 
The jury awarded special damages in the amount of $3,000. 
The jury also awarded general damages in the amount of $5,000, for 
total damages in the amount of $8,000. The verdict was 
appropriately dated and signed by the jury foreperson. The Court 
having inquired of the jury as to its verdict directs the judgment 
to be entered in accordance with the verdict and its Memorandum 
Decision entered September 22, 1993, and incorporated herein by 
reference, which grants plaintiff's additur in the additional 
amount for specials of $19,910.24: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment 
be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, 
Brian Herold, as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant for special damages in the amount of 
$18,328.19 ($3,000 + $19,910.24 X 80%). 
2. The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant for pre-judgment interest of past special 
damages in the amount of $794.40 pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-44. This sum represents interest 
at 10% per annum on $2,400 from October 15, 1990 
through September, 1993. 
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5. 
The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant for general damages in the amount of 
$4,000 ($5,000 x 80%). 
The plaintiff is awarded post-judgment interest 
against the defendant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§15-1-4 consistent with the judgment accruing at 
the rate of 5.72% per annum. 
The plaintiff is awarded his costs against the 
defendant in the amount of $3,124.40. 
The total judgment awarded is $26,246.99 
[$18,328.19 (special damages) + $794.40 (pre-
judgment interest) + $4,000.00 (general damages) + 
DATED this 
$3,124.40 (costs and fees)]. 
M- day of Z2-v 
Leslie A. Lewis 
Third District 
Approved as to form: 
Mark D. Dunn 
Attorney for Defendant 
4839.j'ud 
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